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1. Introduction
Two of the Quinean metaontology’s most basic theses which are so well accepted
that, according to van Inwagen (2009), became the methodological foundations
of a whole ontological tradition, say:
Existence is univocal. (1)
The single sense of existence is adequately captured by the existential quantifier. (2)
If existence is univocal, then there are no different modes of being. Any existing
thing exists precisely in the same sense as anything else. If besides, this unique
sense of existence is captured by the logical quantifiers, then there is only one un-
restricted range of quantification covering everything that there is. If numbers,
stones and attributes exist, then the same variable ‘x’ can take values among num-
bers, stones and attributes. There are no multiple types of variables, but a single
one. So, theses (1) and (2) lead Quine to the following thesis:
∗ This article is a further development of a material published in Session 6 of a previous paper
of mine on ontological commitment. (Durante, 2014). Despite some minor overlaps, the content
here presented develops different arguments in more detail.
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There is a single and unrestricted domain of quantification that covers all there is. (3)
The admission of a single and unrestricted domain of quantification helps explain
the simplicity of the famous slogan “to be is to be the value of a variable” (Quine,
1963c, 15), but it also requires Quine to be careful with what may be among these
values, i.e., with what may exist. I want to relate this idea of ontological caution to
some of the most controversial theses of Quine, such as:
(a) His insistence on accepting only first-order quantification and his rejection
of higher-order logic.
(b) His resistance on accepting the intensionality of ontological commitments.
(c) His rejection of first-order modal logic.
(d) His rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.
I intend to argue that the ontological caution required by principles (1), (2) and (3)
imposes to all theoretical discourses a requirement of extensionality as protection
and that these controversial theses are just interconnected consequences of this
requirement. Moreover, I will also argue that extensionality and even principle
(1) of the univocity of existence are not self-justified in Quine’s approach. They
are consequences of a more basic metaphilosophical principle: Quine’s natural-
ism. So, the metaphilosophical thesis of naturalism and the methodological thesis
(2) of the binding between existence and logical quantification, which took in iso-
lation don’t seem so harmful, are the main responsible factors for all controversial
Quinean theses listed above.
§
One of the primary sources of criticism in Quine’s work is the strictness of the
canonical notation in which theories must be regimented to have their ontological
commitments evaluated. The ontological commitments of a theory are the entities
it assumes exist and, according to Quine,
entities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if some of
them must be counted among the values of the variables in order that the
statements affirmed in the theory be true. (Quine, 1963a, 103)
However, talking about the values of variables of a theory presupposes it to
be regimented in a formal language since there are no variables in natural lan-
guage. Moreover, this formal language where a theory must be regimented be-
fore any evaluation of its ontological commitments is, for Quine, the language
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of first-order classical logic. He argues that we must be able to regiment in a
first-order language whatever deserves to be called a theory. But why not us-
ing second-order logic with its richer language? Why not allowing quantification
over predicates and also relations and thereby to expand the possibilities of the
being through an expansion of what can be a value of a variable?
This alternative, however, is not open to Quine. It is incompatible with
thesis (3), the admission of a single and unrestricted domain of quantification,
because if he admits second order, i.e., if he admits quantification over predicates
and relations, then he immediately gets Russell’s paradox. As Potter (2004, 300)
has well pointed, there are only two ways to avoid Russell’s paradox in second-
order logic: either abandoning the universality of the domain of quantification,
thesis (3), or abandoning extensionality, i.e., considering that there can be predi-
cates ‘G’ and ‘F’ that are true precisely of the same individuals, but are (concep-
tually) distinct: ∃G∃F (∀x (F(x)↔ G(x)) ∧ (G 6= F)).
These, however, are two concessions Quine is not willing to do. As we
have seen, the absolute generality of the domain of quantification (3) is a con-
sequence of the thesis of the univocity of being (1) and of its translatability into
existential quantification (2). So, rejecting (3) requires a rejection of either (1) or
(2). Yet (1) and (2) are among the most basic principles that underlie his entire
philosophical project. (1) is his most basic mataontological thesis and (2) is his
most basic methodological thesis.
The other possibility of avoiding Russell’s paradox in second-order logic
is also not an option for Quine. Giving up extensionality is to abandon what he
considers the minimum requirement for acceptance of any entity, his standard of
ontological admissibility, which is founded on the principles of identity, mainly
on the indiscernibility of identicals. The most obvious clue for Quine that a sup-
posed entity doesn’t exist presents itself when the principle of substitutability
salva veritate is violated in statements containing terms intended to refer to these
supposed entities. In other words, if the assumption of some supposed entities in
our ontology requires an intensional semantical context, then this is the best ev-
idence we can have of the non-existence of those entities (Durante, 2011, 35–36).
As his other famous slogan says, “no entity without identity” (Quine, 1981a, 102).
[W]hat sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaning-
fully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one an-
other? (Quine, 1963c, 4)
Extensionalism is a policy I have clung to through thick, thin, and nearly
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seventy years of logicizing and philosophizing (Quine, 2008, 215)
The only choice left to Quine to avoid paradoxes without giving up his most
basic theses is, therefore, to restrict theory regimentation to first-order classi-
cal logic, abandoning both, second-order quantification and intensional contexts.
Nonetheless, that does not mean assuming a nominalistic position that simply
denies the existence of any abstract entity. Quine accepts and even argues for
abstract entities, provided they are extensional. (Quine, 1963a, 115).
[M]y extensionalist scruples decidedly outweigh my nominalistic ones.
(Quine, 1986, 397)
However, the only legitimate abstract entities Quine accepts are obtained by
transforming an equivalence relation into identity. In this case, the class of indis-
cernible individuals according to the equivalence relation (the equivalence class)
is individuated as a single abstract object whose nature is different from the na-
ture of the indistinguishable individuals that compose it (Quine, 1963a, 117). If,
for example, our individuals are three-dimensional physical objects and we ag-
gregate them in equivalence classes composed of objects with the same volume,
then to treat this volumetric equivalence as identity represents a change of on-
tology. It means stop talking about concrete three-dimensional physical objects
and start talking about abstract volumes. Whatever property such an equiva-
lence class has, or relation it engages in, it will be a property or relation of an
abstract volume, not of concrete physical objects. The individuation movement
that reifies this abstract entity is obviously driven by the principle of identity of
indiscernibles, and it is allowed by Quine only because it respects the law of in-
discernibility of identicals, which is a criterion for extensionality.
So, to ensure that our theories can deal with these abstract entities which,
in turn, comply with the restrictions of extensionality, Quine enriches the lan-
guage of canonical notation with a binary predicate for membership, ‘∈’, and
adds the axioms of his set theory NF (Quine, 1963b) to the ones of first-order
classical logic.1 This formal system is, according to him, the only one we need for
all theoretical discourses.
Our theories then ontologically commit to abstract entities only when they
are explicitly regimented in NF as classes. When we say, for instance, that some
dogs are white through the following regimented sentence,
1 Moreover, Quine removes individual constants from canonical notation, adopting Russell’s
theory of descriptions as a substitute for singular terms. Thus, variables become the only vehicle
for reference, which assures formal correction to its famous motto about being: “to be is to be the
value of a variable’’.
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∃x (Dog(x) ∧White(x))
we do not commit ourselves to abstract entities such as dogness or whiteness. To
assume such commitments, according to Quine (1963a, 113), we have to interpret
dogness and whiteness as classes and state that something is a member of both
of them:
∃x (x ∈ dogness ∧ x ∈ whiteness) 2
So regimented, however, abstract entities are constrained by theory NF, which
while keeping them both extensional and protected from paradoxes, 3 it accepts
the universal set, and it is, therefore, compatible with thesis (3) of unrestricted
quantification, which is so fundamental to Quine. 4
This helps us understand another heavily criticized issue of Quine’s phi-
losophy: his insistence on the extensionality of ontological commitments. If the
formal methods Quine accepts for theory regimentation avoid intensional con-
texts, and if the ontological commitments of a theory are certain values of its
variables, those who are required for the truth of the theory’s statements, then, as
much as the values of variables are protected from intensionality, the ontological
commitments should also be so protected. It was probably this trivial reasoning
that led Quine to say without further arguments that “the question of the on-
tology of a theory is a question purely of the theory of reference” (Quine, 1951,
2 I use ‘dogness’ and ‘whiteness’ as names for the classes of dogs and white stuff respectively,
just to shorten the formalization in canonical notation, which by requiring the removal of names
and their replacement with descriptions, would have the following longer and less elegant form:
∃x (∃y ∀z ((Dogness(z)↔ y = z) ∧ x ∈ y) ∧ ∃u∀w ((Whiteness(w)↔ u = w) ∧ x ∈ u))
There are ontological commitments to the classes of dogs and white things (dogness and
whiteness) because these classes are the values of the variables ‘y’ and ‘u’ required to make
the sentence true. It is worth noticing that ‘Dog’ is the predicate satisfied by only and all
dogs and ‘Dogness’ is the predicate satisfied by only one entity, the class of all dogs. I.e.,
∃y ∀z ((Dogness(z)↔ y = z) ∧ ∀x (Dog(x)↔ x ∈ y)). The same holds for ‘White’ and ‘Whiteness’.
3 Up to now, nobody has found any contradiction in NF, but as a consequence of Godel’s
theorem, we know that without compromising suppositions there is no way to ensure that any
formal set theory is consistent (free from contradictions and paradoxes). So, the protection against
paradoxes thatNF or any other set theory provides isn’t perfect. But it is as good as it can be.
4 The formalized set theory most commonly used is Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory which, how-
ever, would not serve Quine’s purposes because its methods to avoid Russell’s and other para-




However, discourses on values of a theory’s variables are local; they are
concerned only to the theory and need not be relativized. They are internal, and
its intelligibility requires no metatheory. To this extent, Quine’s precaution pro-
tects them from intensionality. On the other hand, discourses on ontological com-
mitments are external to the theory. They occur in ontological debates whose rea-
soning demands a metatheory with more sophisticated formal tools than Quine
allows for theories themselves.
It is not difficult to see that the very same phenomenon of referential opac-
ity Quine uses to reject first-order modal logic (Quine, 1963d) occurs with the
notion of ontological commitment. If we try to theoretically accommodate the
notion of ontological commitment under Quine’s extensional canonical notation
we immediately get in trouble. Suppose, for instance, an ontological debate be-
tween the holders of these two theories:
T1 ∃x Angel(x) — (There are angels)
T2 ¬∃x Angel(x) — (There are no angels)
If we try to state this debate in an extensional theory of ontological commitment
formalized on Quine’s canonical notation, the views of these two theories’ pro-
ponents could be stated respectively as: 5
∃y ∃x (Angel(x) ∧ ComT1(y) ∧ x ∈ y) (4)
∃z∀x ((Angel(x) ∧ ComT2(z))→ x /∈ z) 6 (5)
Yet as a simple logical consequence of (4) and (5) we have:
∃z∃x (Angel(x) ∧ ComT2(z) ∧ x /∈ z) (6)
5 There are many different forms to express in an extensional way the relation of a theory Ti
to its ontological commitments. I just choose to use predication ComTi(y) to characterize that y is
the class of the ontological commitments of Ti, and to useNF’s membership relation to state that
the members of the class y such that ComTi(y) are exactly the ontological commitments of Ti.
6 We can see that (5) is a fair way to state T2’s holders view because besides assuring that
there are no angels among the ontological commitments ofT2, (5) itself doesn’t assume any com-
mitment with angels while saying that. It says that truly even when the extension of ‘Angel’ is
empty.
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However, (6) does not do justice to the position of the holders of T2. They would
immediately disagree that there are angelical things they don’t assume as onto-
logical commitments. It was precisely this disadvantageous situation of claims
of non-existence in an ontological debate that motivated Quine to propose the
notion of ontological commitment at first place (Quine, 1963c). 7
This situation illustrates that in ontological debates we cannot treat on-
tological commitments the same extensional way we treat the values of inter-
preted theory’s variables. Values of variables can be thought extensionally as the
things themselves, but ontological commitments can’t. Otherwise, the metathe-
ory would ontologically commit itself with all commitments of the debating the-
ories, and this would not help to solve the debate in a neutral way. Such an
extensional notion of ontological commitment would be completely useless. It
would let Quine in the same situation from where he started: hung on Plato’s
beard.
When I say that theory T1 is ontologically committed with angels, I’m
not talking about angels, after all, they may not exist. Instead, I’m talking about
concepts, intensions, meanings of angels. And as Cartwright (1954), Scheffler and
Chomsky (1958), Parsons (1967), Jubien (1972), Chateaubriand (2003) and others
have shown, there is no way to make clear this difference in an extensional theory
likeNF.
Therefore, although regimentation resources allowed by Quine ensure that
ontologies of all regimented theories are extensional, still the notion of ontolog-
ical commitment will not be, because it requires us to put theories and the enti-
ties they assume into perspective, in a situation where they can be compared in
the same way we do in an intensional semantics of possible worlds. Wherever
we have formal resources strong enough to describe different universes and to
compare them and the way they affect truth and falsity of sentences, we will be
out of extensionality. These resources are not only required by first-order modal
logic, but they are also a minimum requirement needed to make any discourse
7 Someone could protest, saying that we should have to have two predicates for
angels, ‘Angel1’ in T1 and ‘Angel2’ in T2. If so, sentence (6) would turn into (6’):
∃z ∃x (Angel1(x) ∧ ComT2(z) ∧ x /∈ z), which is committed with the existence of angels in T1’s
sense, but not in T2’s sense. In such a situation the ontological foes have two options: they
can agree on the equivocality of their debate. They are not talking about the same thing. But
such agreement implies (through (6’)) that T2’s holders concede that angels in T1’s sense do ex-
ist. Then, the debate has changed nothing on the view of T1’s holders. It is a victory for them.
The other option is denying the equivocality of the debate. There are no two different senses of
angel. Then, we don’t need two predicates ‘Angel1’ and ‘Angel2’, but only one, ‘Angel’, which take
us back to the situation where (6) ensures again the victory for T1’s holders.
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about ontological commitments intelligible. Thus, even in a situation where all
admissible ontologies are extensional, there is no way to present a clear notion of
ontological commitment that is also extensional. So, the very same reason Quine
has to reject first-order modal logic is a reason to reject the notion of ontological
commitment.8
Perhaps because he realized this fact, after the end of the sixties Quine
stopped talking about ontological commitments. Instead of trying to answer his
critics, he focused his attention on proposing a minimalist and extensional ontol-
ogy consisting only of classes, which he thought was suitable for all science. He
didn’t explicitly reject the notion of ontological commitment or change his view
on the subject, but, as suggested by Chateaubriand (2003), he regarded the dis-
course on ontological commitment as just a way of talking. If discourses about
ontological commitment require intensional contexts, then these discourses can’t
be regimented in his canonical notation, and therefore they are not theoretical.
They are, at best, just a loose way of talking.
But this is a serious issue for Quine because his notion of ontological com-
mitment is the primary methodological tool he designed to assure rationality to
ontological debates. Giving up ontological commitment is to abandon the possi-
bility of presenting a rational and conclusive philosophical argument that decides
on alternative ontologies. No wonder that the ostracism Quine put the notion
of ontological commitment began in the same period in which he proposed his
views on the inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity. As his famous
proxy function argument has settled, in many cases “there can be no evidence for
one ontology over against another” (Quine, 1992, 8).
Quine’s entrenched “extensionalist scruples” are responsible not only for
his rejection of first-order modal logic and of higher-order logic. As we just have
seen, they are also the reason why he lost interest in the notion of ontological
commitment and adopted the thesis of ontological relativity and inscrutability of
reference. Not only that, but extensionalism is also a major motivation for Quine
to reject the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. According to
his famous arguments from “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (Quine, 1963e), such a
distinction would depend on the establishment of a theory of meaning founded
on a notion of synonymy whose intelligibility would be extensionally unscrupu-
lous by requiring an intensional context.
8 We, of course, don’t need to do that, as Church (1958) showed, even being intensional the
idea of ontological commitment still useful and fundamental to ontology. Quine’s extensionalism,
however, leaves him no other option but abandon his own notion of ontological commitment.
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Why Quine advocates so fundamentally this demanding thesis of exten-
sionality, rejecting any notion that contravenes it? We have already seen that
Quine uses extensionality as a standard of ontological admissibility, excluding
any supposed entity whose intelligibility requires intensional contexts. Our ques-
tion now is why does he do it? Being extensionality such a demanding thesis that
leads to all these controversial rejections, what kind of gain it offers? What justi-
fies Quine’s extensional scruples?
I’ll answer this question in two steps. First, Quine’s defense of extension-
ality and consequent rejection of the notions of meaning theory and of everything
that requires intensional contexts can be understood as a more fundamental com-
promise with thesis (1) of the univocity of existence. Any formal treatment of
intensional contexts requires one of the following alternatives: (a) a logic explic-
itly of higher order (second or greater) and, along with it, the typifying of vari-
ables and the irreconcilable separation of distinct domains of quantification that
is necessary to prevent Russell’s paradox; or (b) the use of non-truth functional
operators whose occurrence in formulas introduces contexts of referential opac-
ity, whose quantification into, as in ‘∃x2P(x)’, demands the admission of more
subtle modes of existence that are distinct from the mode of existence of actual
entities. Alternative (a) is a direct violation of thesis (3) therefore it violates at
least one of its premises: theses (1) or (2). However, the own statement of al-
ternative (a) is according to thesis (2), after all, we are talking there of a formal
treatment whose quantifiers and variables are our ontological resources. Then,
it is clear that alternative (a) violates the thesis (1) of the univocity of existence.
It is also clear that alternative (b) violates (1) too, because if we live in a world
where there are no angels, but there could have been, then the status of angels
as non-actual but possible existent beings is a sense of existence clearly different
from the sense of my or your existence, which is actual.
This leads us to the second step of our response, which starts with another
question: why Quine advocates in such a fundamental way the thesis (1) of the
univocity of being? Why not admitting alternative modes of existence catchable
by distinct domains of quantification? It would suffice to accept this possibility to
be allowed accommodating both intensional contexts and the use of higher-order
logic. This not only could soften a little the austerity of his narrow canonical
notation, as well as it could free him from several criticisms, objections and pro-
hibitions.
The answer lies in the naturalism of his conception of philosophy. Quine’s
naturalism mainly means that he sees no essential distinction between philoso-
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phy, mathematics, and science. Philosophy does not legislate or regulate science
or mathematics but collaborates with them.
[I]t is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality
is to be identified and described. (Quine, 1981b, 21)
The philosopher’s task differs from the others’ then in detail, but in no
such drastic way as those suppose who imagine for the philosopher a van-
tage point outside the conceptual scheme he takes in charge. There is no
such cosmic exile. (Quine, 1960, 275)
We can interpret that violation of thesis (1) contradicts naturalism. The
admission of distinct ways of being that could be addressed by different sorts of
variables confined to distinct types of quantifiers, which therefore would not be
absolutely generic, opens space for a fundamental separation between philoso-
phy and the rest of science. While to science would correspond the sense of being
connected to individuals, actual beings and extensional abstractions, to philoso-
phy would fit the sense of being connected to intensional contexts, meanings, and
non-actual universes. The incommunicability between the domains of quantifi-
cation could protect and insulate philosophy in an inadmissible “cosmic exile”.
For Quine, there is no place for philosophy outside the same conceptual
scheme we use to do science. As much as (and for the same reasons that) we
can change our scientific theories and paradigms, we can also change our philo-
sophical claims. There is no analyticity nor a prioriness protecting philosophical
claims from possible revision. However, if we allow multiple modes of being, if
we give up the univocity of existence, then we open room for this kind of sep-
aration. The realm of intensional beings, for instance, would be untouchable by
recalcitrant empirical observations. It would demand another way of thinking,
another conceptual scheme, which is forbidden by Quine’s naturalism.
In short, the two steps of our answer to the question of why Quine defends
extensionalism so firmly is that (i) extensionalism is required to ensure the thesis
of the univocity of being and (ii) the univocity of being, in turn, is required to
ensure naturalism, which is his most fundamental metaphilosophical thesis.
Although, as we have seen in the case of ontological commitments, it is
not that easy to constrain our philosophical discourses to the same conceptual
scheme Quine has devised for science and knowledge in general. Even under his
austere regimentation requirements, intensionality and the need for separation of
modes of being shows up in most of the philosophical discourses we engage.
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Quine has never responded directly to the critics who pointed out that in-
telligibility of his notion of ontological commitment requires an intensional con-
text, and after the end of the 1960s, he seldom furthered the subject. Instead of
solving the problems caused by extravagant ontological commitments of artifi-
cially constructed outlandish theories, he has chosen to focus his attention on the
substantive proposition of a minimalist and extensional ontology consisting only
of classes, which he thought was suitable for all science. He also proposed that
only scientific theories should have its ontological commitments evaluated.
We could, therefore, to accuse him of trying to remove from the scope of
philosophical considerations legitimate questions that not only should be there,
as have been there throughout history. After all, we conceptualize and we mean.
Not only that, but we also think, consider, believe, forbid, doubt, theorize, allow,
conceive, admit, assume and so many other activities that lead us to intensional
contexts.
When confronted with such charges, Quine’s answer is radical, almost im-
polite. It is a stark commitment to naturalism, which justifies us to regard it as
his most fundamental thesis and reminds us that, despite having exceeded the
ideas of logical positivists in many ways, he kept for himself the same project
of philosophy that inspired the investigations of his teacher Carnap and other
philosophers of the Vienna Circle:
If certain problems of ontology, say, or modality, or causality, or contrary-
to-fact-conditionals, which arise in ordinary language, turn out not to
arise in science as reconstituted with the help of formal logic, then those
problems have in an important sense been solved: they have been shown
not to be implicated in any necessary foundation of science. [...] Philoso-
phy of science is philosophy enough. (Quine, 1953, 446)
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